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I. INTRODUCTION
0NE OF THE issues arising with increasing frequency in
products liability litigation, including aviation related
cases, is the question of how the courts should respond
when a party is found to be responsible for altering, failing
to preserve, losing, or destroying crucial pieces of evidence.
A number of courts and commentators have recently begun
to address these questions, suggesting a variety of possible
solutions and remedies for such "spoliation" of evidence.
The resulting opinions offer a range of available sanctions,
which have been imposed on the basis of conduct along a
continuum of culpability from mere carelessness to willful
misconduct.
The purpose of this article is to group significant cases
broadly by the nature of the remedy fashioned by the court
and by the character of the conduct found to justify impos-
ing each remedy upon the wrongdoer. It is hoped that
analysis of the cases in this manner will provide the aviation
practitioner with a valuable understanding of the current
trends in spoliation law and serve as an aid in formulating
case strategy when spoliation problems arise.
Part II provides a general overview of the nature and
scope of spoliation remedies. The sources of judicial au-
thority to punish spoliation, the objectives of courts impos-
ing such punishment, and the types of remedies that have
emerged are summarized.
Part III discusses cases in which courts, faced with a spoli-
ation issue, imposed the ultimate available punishment on
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the wrongdoer: dismissal of its claims or the entry of judg-
ment against it. Part III additionally examines the nature of
the actions and conduct found to warrant this rather ex-
treme remedy. Examples are given of cases where disposi-
tive action was taken by the courts for willful, grossly
negligent or reckless, and merely careless acts resulting in
the loss or destruction of evidence.
Part IV examines cases where the courts found that the
appropriate remedy for the acts of spoliation in question
was the exclusion of evidence and/or expert testimony
from the wrongdoer's case-in-chief. This section considers
the courts' apparent desire to "level the playing field" in
applying the exclusion remedy.
Part V briefly discusses the most traditional and arguably
the least effective of the spoliation remedies: an instruction
to the jury that a rebuttable adverse presumption arises that
the destroyed or lost evidence, if produced, would have
been unfavorable to the wrongdoer. The continuing viabil-
ity of this remedy and the rationale for its imposition are
examined.
Part VI examines the relatively recent development of in-
dependent tort remedies for spoliation which may be
brought by the aggrieved party against the wrongdoer. The
evolution of these remedies, their current status, and the
elements of the torts as delineated by the courts that recog-
nize them are discussed.
Finally, Part VII, for the consideration of the aviation
practitioner, raises questions about the application of the
emerging law of spoliation to the conduct of an accident
investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB). Such investigations frequently are conducted, at
least in part, with direct participation by potential defend-
ants or their representatives (for example, airframe manu-
facturers, power plant manufacturers, and component
suppliers) and often without any participation by potential
plaintiffs. The statutory and regulatory framework under
which these investigations are conducted are outlined, and
authorities are discussed which indicate that a private party
1995] 999
1000 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [60
participating in such an investigation at the request of the
NTSB investigator-in-charge may be subject to spoliation
remedies if evidence is lost as a result of the party's actions
in connection with the NTSB investigation. Measures are
suggested which, if taken by such private participants, may
reduce the possibility of spoliation claims arising while they
fulfill their roles as members of the investigative team.
II. OVERVIEW OF SPOLIATION
The term "spoliation of evidence" refers to the loss, de-
struction or material alteration of tangible evidence,
whether negligent or intentional. Spoliation may be due to
careless inaction, mere fault, or simple negligence and does
not always involve blatant conduct of the "willful," "bad
faith," "deliberate," or "grossly negligent" type. The spolia-
tion may occur prior to or after the commencement of
litigation.
Spoliation of evidence involved with products liability
lawsuits is not a novel problem; however, during the past six
years, federal and state courts around the country have be-
gun to take a more aggressive approach to addressing this
recurring problem. To date, the majority of the decisions
have arisen over spoliation claims raised by defendants.
Frequently, a defendant manufacturer, faced with claims of
product defect, finds itself deprived of the opportunity to
conduct an examination of the allegedly defective product
because of prior spoliation. This situation often arises after
an opposing party, and frequently that party's expert, has
examined, and perhaps even tested, the product.' Spolia-
tion claims can also arise against a manufacturer, for exam-
ple, where a plaintiff releases key evidence to a
manufacturer or its insurance company for examination
during pre-litigation claim evaluation and the evidence is
lost or destroyed, either before or after it is tested by the
defendant.
I See Sam LaManna, Courts Take a Harder Line On Spoliation, NAT'L L. J., July 26,
1993, at 17.
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In such a situation, the party deprived of the evidence in
question may be faced with insurmountable difficulty in
proving its claim or defense. The potential harm from spo-
liation of evidence is greatest in these situations, and the
imposition of sanctions by courts within their broad discre-
tionary powers is most warranted. Increasingly, courts have
recognized that they must take some action to compensate
the aggrieved party for the loss of the evidence, to "level the
playing field," and to deter future incidents of spoliation.2
Courts often find their authority to take corrective action
to grant relief to the aggrieved party for the spoliation
under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or
when in state court, the local counterpart to that rule.'
When the discovery sanction rule may not apply, courts are
vested with inherent powers that are governed not by rule
or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to
manage their affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expedi-
tious disposition of cases.4
For the purpose of this article, the remedies fashioned by
the courts are grouped into four very broad categories.
First, and most extreme in nature, courts have with increas-
ing frequency found that spoliation of key evidence in
products liability cases may justify sanctions constituting a
total adverse disposition of the case against the alleged
wrongdoer. These sanctions include, among others, dismis-
sal of the wrongdoer's claims, entry ofjudgment on liability
issues, and striking of defenses. Second, courts have en-
tered sanctions that attempt to "level the playing field" by
2The purpose of sanctions for spoliation is "not merely to penalize those whose
conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be
tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent." National Hockey
League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976).
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37; Federal Ins. Co. v. Allister Mfg. Co., 622 So. 2d 1348, 1350
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
4 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R.
Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962)); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng'r & Mfg. Corp.,
982 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Synergy Gas, Inc., 585 So.
2d 822, 826 (Ala. 1991); Capitol Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smedley, 614 So. 2d 439 (Ala.
1993) (Alabama law recognizes that the trial court is vested with broad and consider-
able discretion to determine the appropriate remedy for spoliation).
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removing from the case any advantage the wrongdoer may
have achieved from the evidence which has been denied to
the other party. These sanctions most frequently involve
exclusion by the court of testimony from the wrongdoer's
expert who examined the lost evidence and/or exclusion of
any testing or analysis the wrongdoer completed on the lost
evidence. Third, and historically the least potent sanction
in practice, the courts have attempted to correct the spolia-
tion problems by instructing the jury that a presumption
exists that the missing piece of evidence, if produced,
would have been adverse to the wrongdoer.
The fourth remedy differs substantially from the first
three. Rather than attempting to address the effects of spo-
liation within the context of the products liability claim it-
self, a few courts have recognized a separate tort action
against the wrongdoer based on spoliation. Under such a
tort claim, the wrongdoer may be subjected to damages for
the loss or destruction of critical evidence. This tort claim
may be asserted by way of counterclaim or cross-claim in the
products liability suit, or may be asserted in a separate law-
suit. Both negligent and intentional spoliation have been
recognized as tort claims. The elements of each claim are
discussed below.
Each of the four types of sanctions has been imposed by
the courts on the basis of some type of culpable conduct by
the wrongdoer. The types of conduct range from simple
carelessness or neglect, to gross negligence or recklessness,
to actual willfulness. In the sections that follow, cases are
arranged by the type of sanction imposed and, where possi-
ble, by the level of wrongful conduct which supported that
sanction.
III. THE SANCTION OF DISMISSAL OR DEFAULT
FOR SPOLIATION
The case law concerning sanctions for evidence destruc-
tion has evolved only recently; more than eighty percent of
the cases in this area have been reported in the past dec-
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ade.5 Although a variety of sanctions are available, the pen-
alty in more than half the reported spoliation sanction
cases has been dismissal or default judgment.6 Willful con-
duct would seem to be the most likely to result in dismissal
or default; however, in the cases that follow, the courts have
been willing to grant dismissal or default relief to the non-
offending party in situations where the conduct amounted
to little more than bad judgment and carelessness.
A. DIsMIssAL OR DEFAULT WHEN SPOLIATION RESULTS
FROM WILLFUL CONDUCT
When a party spoliates evidence intentionally, willfully, or
in bad faith, the sanctions of dismissal or directed verdict in
favor of the party deprived of the evidence are clearly ap-
propriate. For example, in Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc.7 the
Alabama Supreme Court recognized that in some cases
such a severe sanction is simply the only appropriate rem-
edy. In Iverson, the supreme court upheld the trial court's
sanction of dismissal for destruction of evidence in direct
violation of a court order." Iverson sued Xpert, alleging
that Xpert diagnosed Iverson's automobile as having a de-
fective fuel pump, when, in fact, the fuel pump was in good
working order. Xpert filed a motion with the trial court
requesting production and/or inspection of the fuel pump.
The court ordered the production, but it was never pro-
duced. Iverson, in fact, allowed the fuel pump to be de-
stroyed in direct violation of the court's order. The
Alabama Supreme Court focused on the trial court's dismis-
sal of the action for intentional refusal to provide discovery,
and concurred in the trial court's specific finding that Iver-
son had "willfully discarded the fuel pump to avoid
production."9
5 Lawrence B. Solum & StephenJ. Marzen, Destraion of Evidence, 16 LrriG. 11, 12
(1989).
6 I&
7 553 So. 2d 82 (Ala. 1989).
a Id. at 86-87.
9 Id. at 86.
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This type of extreme misconduct, however, is not re-
quired to warrant dismissal for "intentional" spoliation of
evidence. Intentional destruction of material evidence long
before the commencement of suit, when no court has yet
ordered discovery, may also subject the case to dismissal if
the party destroying the evidence knows or should know an
action will likely be filed involving the evidence. Although
many cases rely on Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or its state law counterpart to sanction destruc-
tion of evidence, prelitigation destruction must be reme-
died by reliance upon the court's inherent powers to
control and manage its affairs. 10
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. FrigidaireI State Farm
brought an action against Frigidaire, alleging one of
Frigidaire's dishwashers had caused a home fire. After
State Farm's expert inspected the dishwasher, State Farm
informed its insured that she could dispose of the dish-
washer, there being no need to save it anymore. As a result,
Frigidaire was denied the opportunity to inspect the dish-
washer. Frigidaire filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alter-
native, to bar State Farm from presenting any evidence,
direct or circumstantial, regarding the condition of the
dishwasher. The court concluded that State Farm's com-
plaint should be dismissed due to State Farm's failure to
preserve the allegedly defective product, knowing it would
be material evidence in the products liability action. 12
Likewise, in Capitol Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smedley13 the Alabama
Supreme Court held that the lawsuit should have been dis-
missed since the insurer had authorized the sale of the
product in issue for salvage eleven months prior to the time
the action was filed against the manufacturer. Smedley
purchased a conversion van from Capitol Chevrolet. Ap-
proximately five months later, the van was destroyed by fire.
10 But see Beil v. Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 1994). Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 37 is a procedural rule, governing only conduct during
the pendency of a lawsuit.
11 146 F.R.D. 160 (N.D. I1. 1992).
12 Id. at 163.
1- 614 So. 2d 439 (Ala. 1993).
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Auto Owners Insurance Company, Smedley's insurance car-
rier, investigated the fire, paid Smedley for the van, and dis-
posed of the van. Smedley and Auto Owners then sued
Capitol and General Motors (GM) to recover damages. The
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, and Capitol
and GM appealed.14
Capitol and GM requested that the case be dismissed due
to the spoliation of evidence. In support of their position,
they submitted the affidavit of their expert who had worked
for GM for over thirty years. That expert stated that he had
reviewed the available file material as well as the plaintiffs'
photographs of the van and concluded that, because of the
limited information available, he was extremely disadvan-
taged in making a determination of the true cause or origin
of the fire. The expert explained that an important aspect
of determining the exact cause and origin of vehicle fire is
an examination of the van as well as any trailer involved and
the fire artifacts at the scene. He further stated that the
photographs taken by the plaintiffs were inadequate be-
cause they reflected the findings and conclusions of the
plaintiffs' expert and did not'present a complete picture of
the van in such detail as would be necessary for him to de-
termine the exact cause and origin.15
In Capitol, the court found that when Auto Owners dis-
patched its expert to inspect the van and to make photo-
graphs, Auto Owners knew or reasonably should have
known it might sue Capitol and GM.16 The stark result was
that relevant evidence was irreparably lost by Auto Owners'
actions. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the
trial court had abused its discretion by not dismissing the
case. 17 The court found that Smedley's homeowner's policy
paid him for the loss of his vehicle as well as his personal
belongings. 8 The court pointed out that this case was es-
14 Id. at 440.
15 l at 441.
16 Id. at 442.
17 Id. at 443.
is Capito4 614 So.2d at 443.
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sentially a subrogation claim brought by an insurance com-
pany that ordered the destruction of items that would have
been crucial evidence in this case. 19
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Nevada in Stubli v. Big D.
International Trucks, Inc.,2° held that dismissal was justified
where evidence was destroyed through intentional miscon-
duct.21 In Stubli, a truck driver who was involved in a single
vehicle accident brought a products liability and negligent
repair action against the manufacturer of the truck trailer
and the company that repaired the trailer's suspension sys-
tem. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss
based on the destruction of the trailer just prior to the fil-
ing of the truck driver's complaint, and the plaintiff subse-
quently appealed. The court held that dismissal of the
truck driver's action was an appropriate discovery
sanction.2
On June 27, 1984, the plaintiff, Stubli, was involved in an
accident allegedly due to separation of part of the trailer's
suspension system (the spring hammer) from the trailer
frame. Defendant Big D. had repaired the spring hammer
by welding it back to the trailer frame in December of 1983.
Stubli's insurance company, Northwestern, hired a mechan-
ical engineer, Limpert, to inspect the trailer wreckage. As a
result, Limpert submitted photographs and a detailed re-
port. Limpert concluded that the right front spring ham-
mer had fractured from the frame and that the cause of the
accident was an inadequate weld repair job by Big D.23 Af-
ter receiving this information, Northwestern retained an at-
torney, McCarthy, to handle the subrogation claim. In a
January 18, 1985 letter to McCarthy, Northwestern advised
the attorney that fees for storing the trailer would soon sur-
pass the trailer's salvage value. Thus, Northwestern re-
quested that McCarthy expedite any additional inspections
19 Id
2o0 810 P.2d 785 (Nev. 1991).
21 Id. at 787.
22 Id. at 788.
23 Id. at 786.
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and discovery and inquired whether there would be any
harm in inviting the defendants to inspect the trailer.
Neither defendant received such an invitation to inspect
the wreckage. The allegedly failed part of the trailer was
saved, and the plaintiff's counsel advised Northwestern on
March 8, 1985 that the remainder of the trailer was dis-
carded as salvage. On May 14, 1985, Stubli filed a com-
plaint against Big D. Despite Big D.'s discovery efforts as
early as September of 1985, Limpert's report and photo-
graphs were not provided to Big.D. until August of 1988. At
that time, Big D. also learned that the trailer wreckage, less
those portions in Limpert's custody, had been discarded. 4
Thereafter, Stubli filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to
Nevada Rule 37. The district court entered an order grant-
ing the motion. On review, the Supreme Court of Nevada
held that a "somewhat heightened" standard of review
should apply where the discovery sanction was dismissal.2 5
Citing Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Building Inc.26 the court set
forth a nonexhaustive list of factors that a court may prop-
erly consider in deciding whether dismissal is an appropri-
ate sanction:
1. the degree of willfulness of the offending party;
2. the extent to which the non-offending party would be
prejudiced by a lesser sanction;
3. the severity of the sanction of dismissal relative to the se-
verity of the discovery abuse;
4. whether any evidence has been irreparably lost;
5. the policy favoring adjudication on the merits;
6. whether sanctions unfairly operate to penalize a party for
the misconduct of his or her attorney; and
7. the need to deter both the parties and future litigants
from similar abuses.2
7
The court held that the dismissal of the Stubli case was a
proper response to destruction of evidence and that the re-
24 Id at 787.
25 Id.
- 787 P.2d 777 (Nev. 1990).
Stubli, 810 P.2d at 787 (citing Young, 787 P.2d at 780).
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quirements of Young had been satisfied for the following
reasons:
1. the loss of evidence... was wholly due to willful actions
taken by Stubli's counsel . . . and Stubli's expert, prior to
any involvement in [the] case by [the defendants];
2. a plethora of expert testimony support[ed] [the defend-
ants'] contention that examination of the lost evidence
would be necessary to prove or disprove [the plaintiff's]
theory; and
3. imposition of a lesser sanction such as excluding
Limpert's testimony while allowing [the plaintiff] to pro-
ceed on the basis of circumstantial evidence would be insuf-
ficient to cure the prejudice sustained by [the
defendants] .2
Stubli's claims all revolved around the allegedly defective
design and repair of the trailer's suspension system that was
discarded by Stublijust prior to the time that the complaint
was filed. While no court order existed compelling discov-
ery, the timing of the destruction of evidence was due to
the actions of Stubli's counsel and expert and could not be
relied upon by Stubli to preclude the imposition of discov-
ery sanctions pursuant to Rule 37. The court held that,
"[a]lthough dismissal precludes adjudication on the merits
and penalizes Stubli for the misconduct of his attorney and
expert, such consequences are unavoidable and are out-
weighed by the need to remedy the unfair litigation prac-
tices employed in this case, and the benefit of deterring
similar abuses in future cases."29
In Graves v. Daley ° the court dismissed the products lia-
bility action due to the destruction of evidence. The home-
owner destroyed an allegedly defective furnace after the
insurer decided that an alleged defective condition in the
furnace was the probable cause of the fire and gave the
homeowner permission to dispose of it. Despite the fact
that the furnace had been destroyed before the products
28 Id. at 788.
29 Id.
- 526 N.E.2d 679 (I1. App. Ct. 1988).
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liability action was filed, and that no specific court order
existed, the dismissal of the products liability action was
justified. 1
The homeowner willingly destroyed the furnace with the
insurer's approval, and the insurer and homeowner knew
or should have known that the alleged defective condition
of the furnace was a crucial piece of evidence and should
have been preserved.3 2 "[P]laintiffs are not free to destroy
crucial evidence simply because a court order was not is-
sued to preserve 'the evidence."3 In this case, the court
could not have issued a preservation order because the fur-
nace was destroyed by the plaintiffs after their experts had
examined it but before the suit was filed. 4 The appellate
court upheld the trial court's order barring all evidence re-
lating to the condition of the furnace and dismissal of the
case.
3 5
B. DISMISSAL OR DEFAULT WHEN SPOLIATION RESULTS
FROM GROSSLY NEGLIGENT OR RECKLESS CONDUCT
Some courts have found that severe sanctions should be
imposed where the conduct resulting in the loss was either
directly or intentionally attributable to the offending party.
Irresponsible actions in view of existing circumstances may
be sufficient to warrant complete disposition of the case.36
Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. was a products liability
action against tire manufacturers. The plaintiff moved for
sanctions against Goodyear because Goodyear had lost the
material evidence of the case.
Goodyear signed a protective order that allowed it to in-
spect the allegedly defective product. Goodyear agreed to
s1 Id. at 680-81.
32 Id. at 682.
' Id. at 681.
4 Id.
Graves, 526 N.E.2d at 681.
s See, e.g., Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 137 F.R.D. 657 (C.D. Il. 1991),
aff'd sub norm. Marrocco v. General Motors Corp., 966 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a directed verdict against the spoliator of evidence was an appropriate
sanction).
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the entry of the protective order requiring it to preserve,
keep safe, and maintain the product in an unaltered state
while in its custody. The local Goodyear store manager had
arranged to have the product shipped via United Parcel
Service (UPS) to Goodyear's Akron office. The decision on
how to package the product was made solely by the store
manager. Approximately sixty days after shipping the prod-
uct, the store manager received a call from Akron advising
him that the shipment had not arrived. The store manager
contacted UPS, and UPS placed a tracer on the shipment.
Sometime later, the store manager learned that part of the
shipment had not been received at Goodyear.
The court concluded that Goodyear violated the protec-
tive order and was grossly negligent in the exercise of its
duty by:
1. its failure to take adequate precautionary measures to
preserve the integrity and safety of the [product];
2. its failure to timely monitor the UPS shipment and deliv-
ery to Goodyear in Akron, Ohio and monitor the apparent
separation and misdelivery of the [product]; and
3. its failure to timely notify Plaintiff's counsel of the miss-
ing [product] when it may have been possible for Plain-
tiff['s] [counsel] to initiate their own investigation and
independently trace the [product] through UPS. 7
The court held that Goodyear's product was material and
irreplaceable evidence necessary to establish the plaintiff's
theories of a manufacturing defect or deviation from design
specification. 8 In this type of case, physical examination by
a qualified engineer would be necessary to ascertain
whether the Goodyear product deviated from its design and
manufacturing specifications.3 9 The loss of the product
substantially prejudiced the plaintiff's ability and opportu-
nity to establish and prove the existence of a manufacturing




defect that may have proximately caused or contributed to
the plaintiff's injuries.4
The court subsequently granted the plaintiff's motion for
sanctions and ordered that a directed verdict be entered in
favor of the plaintiff.4 The court believed the sanction was
necessary given the alternatives.42 If the plaintiff was to pro-
ceed without the lost evidence, no chance existed for the
plaintiff to prevail on the negligent manufacturing claim.43
Thus, Goodyear would profit from its gross negligence in
mishandling the evidence despite the clear language in the
protective order requiring Goodyear to protect this
evidence. 4
In support of its decision, the court cited Barker v. Bled-
soe,45 which did not involve a protective order, where an ex-
pert destroyed evidence in testing:
When an expert employed by a party or his attorney con-
ducts an examination reasonably foreseeably destructive
without notice to opposing counsel and such examination
results in either negligent or intentional destruction of evi-
dence, thereby rendering it impossible for an opposing
party to obtain a fair trial, it appears that the court would be
not only empowered, but required to take appropriate ac-
tion either to dismiss the suit altogether, or to ameliorate
the ill-gotten advantage. A presumption as to certain evi-
dence is simply not sufficient to protect against such
conduct.46
Based upon the circumstances of the case, the Jones dis-
trict court found the issue of whether it was appropriate to
grant a directed verdict on the negligent manufacturing
claim a proper question to certify to the court of appeals.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that
fault alone would be sufficient. "[T]he Supreme Court has
- l at 664.




45 85 F.RD. 545 (W.D. Okla. 1979).
- Jones, 137 F.R.D. at 664 (citing Barker, 85 F.R.D. at 547-48).
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expressly stated that sanctions may be appropriate in any
one of three instances-where the noncomplying party ac-
ted either with willfulness, bad faith or fault."47
The aforementioned measures of culpability are wholly
different from one another. "Bad faith" is characterized by
conduct which is either intentional or in reckless disregard
of a party's obligation to comply with a court order; "fault,"
by contrast, does not speak to the noncomplying party's dis-
position at all, but rather only describes the reasonableness
of the conduct-or lack thereof-which eventually
culminated in the violation. The court of appeals held that
Goodyear's conduct readily fell within the classification of
"fault."48 Sanctions are not limited solely to situations
where noncompliance with court orders is willful or delib-
erate. Consequently, the court of appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court's sanctions.49
C. DISMISSAL OR DEFAULT WHEN SPOLIATION RESULTS
FROM MERELY CARELESS CONDUCT
The continuum of cases where courts are willing to com-
pletely dispose of a case for spoliation of evidence becomes
complete with the imposition of such sanctions for parties'
or their representatives' failure to take proper care to pre-
serve material evidence. For example, in Jackson v. Nissan
Motor Corp.," the court dismissed the plaintiffs' case as a
sanction for his careless spoliation of evidence. Jackson was
a products liability action against the manufacturer of an
automobile involved in an accident. Before the lawsuit was
filed, the plaintiffs' attorneys located and purchased the
wrecked car. The car was later inspected by the plaintiffs'
expert. Plaintiffs' counsel paid the salvage owner for the
wreck and told him they would remove the vehicle from his
47 Marrocco, 966 F.2d at 224 (citing National Hockey League v. Metropolitan
Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 640 (1976)).
48 /d.
49 Id, at 225.
-o 121 F.R.D. 311 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), revd on other grounds, 888 F.2d 1391 (6th Cir.
1989).
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property as soon as possible. The yard owner was not ad-
vised that the car was an important piece of evidence.
Shortly after the suit was commenced, attorneys for the
defendant began inquiring of plaintiffs' counsel regarding
the whereabouts of the wrecked car. Plaintiffs' counsel was
made aware that the defendant wished to have an expert
examine the vehicle. Plaintiffs' counsel provided only
vague responses to most of these inquiries and delayed
scheduling the defendant's inspection of the car.
After the plaintiffs' counsel failed to remove the car from
the salvage yard as promised, the yard owner notified them
that he would start to charge them storage fees for each day
it remained in his lot. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs did not
remove the car and, in addition, failed to pay the fees as the
yard owner insisted. Eventually, over $800.00 in storage
fees were unpaid. The yard owner threatened to have the
car destroyed if he was not paid. The plaintiffs failed to act
and the yard owner made good on his promise before the
defendant had an opportunity to inspect the car.
The plaintiffs' theory was thatJackson, the driver, was in-
jured when the force of the collision thrust the battery into
the car's interior, spraying battery acid and burning Jack-
son. The defendant's expert testified that without examin-
ing and testing the car he could form no opinion, to a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty, about whether bat-
tery acid was in the car's interior. The court found that the
defendant had been deprived of the opportunity to defend
against the plaintiffs' theory concerning battery acid.
After analyzing these facts, the court found that the plain-
tiffs' attorneys did not act in bad faith or with willfulness.
The plaintiffs' "misconduct arises not from a calculated plot
to deprive defendant of relevant evidence but from ex-
tremely careless inaction."5 Despite the absence of bad
faith, however, the court held that dismissal was warranted:
The difficult sanction of dismissal is justified in this case.
Defendants' experts cannot reasonably share plaintiffs' ex-
51 Id. at 321.
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pert examination of the car. Precluding all of the plaintiffs'
expert testimony undercuts whatever proof of causation
plaintiffs did have. Dismissal is a sanction permitted by Rule
37 and authorized by both the Supreme Court and the Sixth
Circuit .... 2
Likewise, in Stegmiller v. H.P.E., Inc.53 the plaintiff alleged
that an improperly insulated swimming pool filter electro-
cuted her son. After several unsuccessful requests by the
defendants for the plaintiff to produce the filter for exami-
nation, the defendants filed a motion for sanctions request-
ing dismissal of the complaint.
The investigator hired by the plaintiff's attorney picked
up the pool filter in August of 1972. The lawsuit was filed
in 1974. In January of 1973, the filter had been moved to
the attorney's office. Sometime later that month, the attor-
ney moved to new offices. Despite a thorough search, the
pool filter was not found. The court held that the sanction
of dismissal was appropriate because the plaintiff's conduct
reflected an unreasonable non-compliance with discovery.54
The attorney had not taken appropriate safeguards for the
most significant piece of evidence, the filter.
IV. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE AND/OR EXPERT
TESTIMONY
This article treats the sanctions of adverse presumption
and exclusion of evidence and/or expert testimony sepa-
rately. However, it can be argued that the latter is in fact a
logical extension of the former. The loss or destruction of
evidence has long given rise to the presumption that the
evidence, if produced, would be unfavorable to the party
failing to produce it. With the increasing use of experts to
explain everything from the division of the amoeba to the
precise timetable for armageddon, courts are recognizing
that adverse presumptions regarding spoliated evidence
52 Id. at 323.
1- 401 N.E.2d 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (dismissing plaintiff's products liability
lawsuit for inadvertently losing the product).
54 Id. at 1158.
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would pale in comparison to the testimony of expert
witnesses.
The exclusion of all evidence and expert testimony con-
cerning lost or destroyed evidence often has the same effect
as an outright disposition of the case. When dismissal or
default is not granted outright, some courts have instead
excluded expert testimony and evidence concerning the
spoliated product. By doing so, the courts are ameliorating
the offending party's ill-gotten advantage. The courts have
found that any adverse presumption which a court might
have ordered as a sanction for the spoliation of evidence
would be ineffective because it would be easily overcome by
the testimony of the wrongdoer's expert witnesses, which
because of the spoliation becomes essentially uncontro-
verted. Several courts have found such situations to be in-
tolerable and have taken steps to prevent them.
In Unigard Security Insurance Co. v. Lakewood Engineering &
Manufacturing Corp.55 the insurer of a boat that was de-
stroyed by fire brought a subrogation claim against the
manufacturer of an electric space heater that the insurer
alleged was responsible for the fire; the manufacturer coun-
terclaimed in tort for spoliation of evidence. The district
court dismissed the plaintiff's claims, and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. 56 The court of appeals held that
Unigard's evidence was properly excluded as an exercise of
the district court's inherent powers. Courts are vested
with inherent powers that are governed not by rule or stat-
ute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to man-
age their own affairs and to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases.58
The court held that Lakewood was precluded from ob-
taining expert testimony related to whether the heater
caused the fire and that the plaintiff's destruction of key
5 982 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1992).
56 Id. at 366, 371.
57 I& at 368.
58 Id. (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991), quoting Link v. Wa-
bash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)).
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evidence rendered a full defense impossible.59 The court's
determination provided ample support for the discretion-
ary conclusion that allowing Unigard to introduce the testi-
mony of its experts would unfairly prejudice the dictrict
court's ability to conduct a fair trial.60
Unigard's destruction of evidence was not in dispute. It
precluded Lakewood from any opportunity to inspect the
evidence, and it rendered unreliable virtually all of the evi-
dence that a finder of fact could potentially consider.
Given those factors, it was within the district court's discre-
tion to determine that a rebuttable presumption against
Unigard would have been insufficient to cure the prejudice
arising in the context of the case.6' Once the district court
excluded the expert testimony and evidence concerning
the unavailable heater, Unigard lacked the ability to put
forward a prima facie case or to offer any admissible evi-
dence creating a material fact.62 Therefore, summary judg-
ment was entirely appropriate as a matter of law.6"
The Nevada, Supreme Court also held the exclusion of
expert witness testimony appropriate in spoliation cases. In
Fire Insurance Exchange v. Zenith Radio Corp.64 the court held
that a party had a duty to preserve evidence, even prior to
the commencement of litigation, if it knew or reasonably
should have known that the evidence was relevant to the
potential litigation.65  In Fire Insurance Exchange, a fire in-
vestigator, hired by the insurer, determined that a television
set manufactured by the defendant was the cause of the
fire. Discovery revealed that the plaintiff's expert had not
retained the subject television set. The trial court barred
the plaintiff's expert and granted summary judgment for
the defendant. The plaintiff contended that the sanction
was inappropriate as she did not have possession of the evi-
59 Id.
60 Unigard, 982 F.2d at 368.
81 Id, at 369.
62 Id.
63 I.
64 747 P.2d 911 (Nev. 1987).
65 Id. at 914.
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dence at any time during the litigation and because the evi-
dence had been destroyed prior to the commencement of
the action. "[E]ven where an action has not been com-
menced and there is only a potential for litigation, the liti-
gant is under a duty to preserve evidence which it knows or
reasonably should know is relevant to the action."66
The court held that the plaintiff's actions effectively re-
served all expert testimony based upon examination of the
television set.6 7 Any adverse presumption which the court
might have ordered as a sanction for the spoliation of evi-
dence would have paled in comparison to the testimony of
the expert witness. Thus, barring the expert's testimony
was appropriate.68 Where an expert has removed an item
of physical evidence and the item has disappeared, the
court at a minimum should preclude the expert from
testifying:69
The rule should be applied without regard for whether the
expert's conduct occurred before or after the expert was re-
tained by a party to the litigation. The reason for the rule is
the unfair prejudice that may result from allowing an expert
deliberately or negligently to:put himself or herself in the
position of being the only expert with first-hand knowledge
of the physical evidence on which expert opinions as to de-
fects and causation may be grounded.7 °
As a matter of sound policy, an expert should not be per-
mitted to substitute his or her own description of the evi-
dence after he or she has negligently disposed of the
evidence.71
In Northern Assurance Co. v. Ware72 a fire insurer sued the
manufacturer, distributor and installer of a metal chimney,
which purportedly caused a fire, alleging negligence,
661d
67 Id.
69 Nally v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 539 N.E.2d 1017 (Mass. 1989); see also Headley
v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 141 F.R.D. 362 (D. Mass. 1991).
70 Nally, 539 N.E.2d at 1021.
71 /d.
72 145 F.R.D. 281 (D. Me. 1993).
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breach of contract, breach of warranty, and strict liability.
The manufacturer and installer moved to dismiss the action
due to the insurer's decision to allow the house where the
fire occurred to be destroyed before initiation of litigation.
The district court held that the appropriate remedy for the
fire insurer's decision to allow the destruction of the
burned dwelling without preserving relevant evidence and
without notice to the defendants was to prevent the insurer
from presenting testimony or conclusions of its expert as to
the cause of the fire in its case-in-chief.73
In Headley v. Chrysler Motor Corp.74 the plaintiffs intention-
ally allowed the most crucial piece of evidence, the car, to
be destroyed. The court sanctioned the plaintiffs by bar-
ring the introduction of direct or circumstantial evidence
concerning the condition of the car and granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. After the plaintiffs'
expert inspected the allegedly defective car, the car was put
on the auction block. The car was subsequently sold for
$5.00 and crushed. The defendant moved to dismiss or, in
the alternative, to preclude the plaintiffs' expert testimony.
The court cited five factors to be considered before decid-
ing whether evidence should be excluded: (1) whether the
defendant was prejudiced as a result of the spoliation; (2)
whether the prejudice can be cured; (3) the practical im-
portance of the evidence; (4) whether the plaintiff was act-
ing in good faith or bad faith; and (5) the potential for
abuse if the evidence is not excluded.7 5 The court also
noted that the fact the plaintiffs may also have been
prejudiced by their spoliation does not mean that the de-
fendant is not prejudiced. "Equal prejudices" do not cancel
each other out.76 The court concluded that the defendant
was in fact prejudiced, that the prejudice could not be
73 Id.
74 141 F.R.D. 362 (D. Mass. 1991).
75 IL at 365.
76 Id, at 366.
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cured, and that the destroyed evidence was crucial-indeed
the linchpin-to the case framed by the plaintiffs. 77
V. ADVERSE PRESUMPTION INSTRUCTION
Although some courts have found adverse presumption
instructions clearly inadequate in contrast with expert testi-
mony to the contrary, a number of others continue to be-
lieve that, when jurors are instructed that certain evidence
would have been favorable to the party not responsible for
its alteration, loss, or destruction, they will level the playing
field themselves.78 Some courts seem to struggle with find-
ing the appropriate set of facts to warrant the instruction.
The court in Mason v. E. L. Murphy Trucking Co., Inc.,7 9
would require the showing of "intentional" conduct by the
offending party before imposing "any sanction."80 In a sec-
ond case, where the plaintiff had deliberately disposed of
all of a play tent except the part that broke and thereby
destroyed markings that would have conclusively identified
the defendant as the proper manufacturer of the product,
the same court said that the "nature of the inferences or
presumptions to be made ... is dependent upon the party's
intent or motivation."8 1
The Texas courts, while apparently still embracing the
adverse presumption preference, clearly are willing to con-
sider a variety of sanctions intended to address the offend-
ing conduct with "punishment fitting the crime" when
evidence is withheld, altered, lost, or destroyed.8 2 Without
77 Id,
78 See, e.g., Voelkel v. General Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1468, 1482 (D. Kan.
1994) ("[a]ny potential for prejudice from the writings on the belt can be cured
effectively through testimony and jury instructions").
7 769 F. Supp. 341 (D. Kan. 1991).
8o Id. at 345.
81 Martin v. Intex Recreational Corp., 858 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Kan. 1994).
See, e.g., Abcon Paving, Inc. v. Crissup, 820 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1991, no writ) (holding the striking of pleadings and entering judgment to be an
excessive sanction for removal of a portion of a concrete driveway that was the sub-
ject of the lawsuit); Pelt v. Johnson, 818 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991, no
writ) (vacating order striking pleadings for failure to produce checks, check stubs,
and the copies maintained by the plaintiff's bank in the normal course of business);
San Antonio Press, Inc. v. Custom Bilt Machinery, 852 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. App.-San
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finding it necessary to fashion a new tort for spoliation of
evidence, Texas appears to have provided broad discretion
by procedural rules and statutes to its trial courts in impos-
ing sanctions covering a broad spectrum. While favoring
lesser sanctions for spoliation such as "instructions to the
jury" and rulings on "the admission of evidence," Penn-
sylvania courts, in turn, acknowledge that summary disposi-
tion may be appropriate for intentional acts that deprive
the opposing party of crucial evidence to support or defend
a claim.83
VI. TORT REMEDIES
The evolution of tort remedies for spoliation of evidence
presents the most recent and most extensive recognition
that the rights and duties of litigants and potential litigants
will be protected by the courts. A relatively small number
of states have recognized these torts." The interest es-
poused by states to be protected by these torts is the interest
that a civil litigant has in ongoing or prospective litigation.
Damages are seldom stated with specificity, and at least in
California, it is sufficient to plead that the movant's case
was "significantly prejudiced" by the lost or destroyed evi-
dence.8 5 Presently, only three states recognize the tort of
intentional spoliation of evidence-California, Alaska and
Ohio.86
Antonio 1993, no writ) (affirming trial court's restrictions on spoliating party's ex-
pert witness testimony where evidence was altered but not destroyed).
- See, e.g., Shulz v. Barko Hydraulics, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. Pa. 1993) (per-
mitting defendants to move for special spoliation instruction to the jury); Schmid v.
Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 1994) (reversing trial court decision
where expert's testimony had been stricken in case where design defect common to
all similar products was alleged rather than defect unique to the specific injury-
causing product); Schwartz v. Subaru, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (grant-
ing summaryjudgment where subject vehicle was destroyed after notice and request
to inspect).
" Currently, California and Florida recognize the tort of negligent spoliation of
evidence; and California, Alaska and Ohio recognize intentional spoliation of evi-
dence as an independent tort.
-5 Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 836 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
Id.; Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986); Smith v.
Howard Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Ohio 1993). Only two states-California
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Although the California case of Smith v. Superior Court 7 is
most frequently cited as recognizing the tort of intentional
spoliation of evidence in California, both Velasco v. Commer-
cial Building Maintenance Co."8 and Smith (which officially
adopted negligent spoliation) point to Williams v. State9 as
opening the door for the new tort. Williams involved a
claim by an injured party to an automobile accident, alleg-
ing that the investigating officer so botched the investiga-
tion that the plaintiff was prevented from bringing an
action against the person or persons that caused her inju-
ries. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the State from the action, holding that
the plaintiff had failed to establish a "duty" owed by the in-
vestigating officer to an individual involved in a traffic acci-
dent.90 The court was clearly saying, however, that if the
duty were established, an action for "negligent" spoliation
could be properly alleged.
When Smith came before the California Court of Appeals
six months later, intentional rather than negligent acts were
alleged.91 On that occasion the court had little difficulty in
finding a "duty" or "special relationship" between the par-
ties. Defendant, Abbott Ford, Inc., had agreed with Smith's
attorney to preserve the evidence. Its failure to follow
through on the agreement prevented Smith from examin-
ing, testing and thereby pursuing a claim for his injuries.
The court held that a "new tort" should be fashioned with
elements of proof "[a]nalogous to intentional interference
with [a] prospective business advantage."92 Whether pled
as an intentional or negligent act in California, common
elements appear to be: (1) possession or control of the evi-
and Florida-have recognized negligent spoliation of evidence as giving rise to a
separate cause of action. Velasco v. Commercial Bldg. Maintenance Co., 215 Cal.
Rptr. 504 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Bondu v. Gurvich, M.D., 473 So. 2d 1307 (Fla.
Diet. Ct. App. 1984).
- 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1984).
a 215 Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
664 P.2d 137 (Cal. 1983).
- Id. at 142-43.
o' Smith, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
Id. at 832, 836.
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dence in another; (2) duty or agreement to maintain the
evidence; (3) reliance on the duty or agreement; (4) knowl-
edge of the importance of the evidence; and (5) failure to
preserve or maintain the evidence.
In a very brief opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court held
that a claim existed for "interference with or destruction of
evidence.""3 The court stated that the action may be
brought simultaneously with the primary action against an-
other party to that action or against a third party. The acts
of the offending party in Ohio must be "willful," and the
party must have knowledge that "litigation exists or is prob-
able."94 The added element in Ohio is that the willful act
resulting in the alteration, loss, or destruction of the evi-
dence must be "designed to disrupt the plaintiff's case." 95
Another nuance to Ohio law on the subject was added
less than a year after Smith v. Howard Johnson in the case of
Moskovitz v. Mount Sinai Medical Center.96 There the court
stated that, while recognizing intentional spoliation as an
independent tort in Howard Johnson, it was not its intent to
make it the exclusive remedy for "interference with or de-
struction of evidence."97 In Ohio, an award of punitive
damages serves the same purpose when based upon con-
cealment, alteration, loss, or destruction of evidence. Simi-
lar to the California court,98 the Ohio court held that proof
of actual damages was not required whether the award
comes by way of punitive damages or through a compensa-
tory form when alleged as an independent tort.99
As a remedy for an aggrieved litigant deprived of evi-
dence by alteration of an audiotape, the Supreme Court of
Alaska followed California in 1986 by recognizing a "new
tort" of intentional spoliation of evidence. In Hazen v. Mu-
gs Smith v. Howard Johnson, 615 N.E.2d 1037, 1038 (Ohio 1993).
Sid.
9l5 &
635 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1994).
Id. (citing Howard Johnson, 615 N.E.2d at 1038)).
- Velasco, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
- Moskovitz, 635 N.E.2d at 331.
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nicipality of Anchorage'00 Penny Hazen was arrested in 1977
for alleged assignation of prostitution. Hazen's criminal de-
fense attorneys listened to the "arrest tape" made by under-
cover officers, and at a dismissal hearing requested that the
tape be preserved since Hazen was contemplating a civil ac-
tion for false arrest. Hazen's attorneys alleged that it con-
tained statements by Hazen specifically stating to the
undercover officer that sex could not be obtained at her
massage parlor. By the time the tape was delivered to Ha-
zen's attorneys in the civil action, it was largely inaudible.
The court in Hazen held that the spoliation cause of ac-
tion could not be pursued against individual officers with-
out evidence sufficient for a jury to determine which of the
officers committed the act, or evidence of ajoint agreement
or conspiracy between or among them to alter the tape.
10 1
However, the court did hold that the municipality could be
held liable since it had the custody and control of the evi-
dence, and the "discretionary function" exception would be
inapplicable to a "decision to alter an arrest tape. "102
Those decisions by a minority of states illustrate the legal
arguments, policies and philosophies employed to provide
a remedy for an aggrieved party. There are, however,
equally compelling reasons given by some courts for re-
jecting the notion that spoliation of evidence demands rec-
ognition as a "new tort."'0  In Edwards v. Louisville Ladder
Co.10 4 Edwards was injured on the job when he fell from an
allegedly defective ladder manufactured by the Louisville
Ladder Company. Edwards' employer failed to preserve
the ladder after the fall. Edwards sought to recover under a
products liability theory but alleged that he was foreclosed
from proving this theory because the evidence has been
destroyed.
1- 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Alaska 1986).
10, Id.
102 Id. at 466.
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The federal court, interpreting Louisiana law, noted
three policies with which the adoption of the "new tort"
would conflict. First, it could produce an outcome unwar-
ranted if the evidence still existed because "it is impossible
to know what the destroyed evidence would have shown."10 5
Second, it conflicts with the rights of a person to dispose of
his own property as he chooses.1 0 6 There simply was no
duty obliging the employer to preserve property for the
prospective lawsuit absent some agreement, contract, spe-
cial relationship, or statute requiring it. Third, the "tort for
spoliation of evidence is inconsistent with the policy favor-
ing final judgments."' °7 It would give the plaintiff two bites
at the apple: the first lawsuit to establish the relevance of
the piece of missing evidence, and the second against the
party that lost or destroyed it.
Although some practitioners in California recommend
pleading intentional or negligent spoliation as a defense,
counter, and/or cross-claim where the plaintiff or co-de-
fendant is the spoliating party, there is no clear statement
in case law that the principles enunciated in recognizing
the tort can be practically applied to providing relief for a
defendant. In order to provide a more clearcut remedy for
either plaintiff or defendant, a New Jersey court preferred
that states adopt an "analogous" tort to intentional spolia-
tion of evidence, designated "fraudulent concealment of ev-
idence."0 8 The court noted that the elements of both
actions were analogous; however, where the "duty" to pre-
serve under intentional spoliation required an agreement
or order to preserve, fraudulent concealment did not.
Rather, the duty under the latter arose from the foresee-
ability of harm to a party.' 9
There are other states that appear to have considered the
recognition of some form of affirmative relief for the de-
- Id. at 969 (citing Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Litchfield Precision Components,
Inc., 456 N.W.2d 434, 437 (Minn. 1990)).
-o Id. at 970.
107 Id. at 971.
108 Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., 628 A.2d 1108 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993).
- Id. at 1116.
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struction of evidence. Certainly, those jurisdictions that be-
lieve adverse presumptions may be ineffective in certain
circumstances will move toward more extreme measures to
"deter" this behavior. Given the aforementioned com-
ments of the courts in Hirsch and Edwards, it is time to re-
evaluate the validity of the separate tort and perhaps fash-
ion appropriate sanctions with uniform application to
plaintiffs and defendants. If the objective is fairness to all
parties and equal opportunity to prosecute and defend le-
gitimate claims, would the fashioning of evidentiary and dis-
covery rules not accomplish the purpose without imposing
an entirely new cause of action upon the legal system? A
cause of action that lends itself to speculative outcomes and
damage awards is at best tangential to the merits of the un-
derlying case.
VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR AVIATION ACCIDENTS AND
NTSB INVESTIGATIONS
Given the rapid expansion of spoliation claims and de-
fenses, a number of questions arise regarding the probable
impact of the development of the law in this area on the
activities of participants in National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) accident investigations. For example, the
NTSB investigator is likely to ask representatives of the air-
craft's airframe and engine or other component manufac-
turer to participate as part of his or her investigative team.
Their activities as part of that team might be alleged to have
altered or destroyed certain crucial pieces of evidence. If
so, might an injured passenger, a pilot, a maintenance facil-
ity or other interested party whose representatives were not
a part of the investigative team (and who may have re-
quested and been denied participation), raise a spoliation
claim against the manufacturer in a lawsuit resulting from
the accident? To analyze this issue, one must consider the
regulatory framework and the practicalities of aviation acci-
dent investigations.
As most readers are already aware, the NTSB is statutorily
charged with the responsibility to investigate and report
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upon accidents and incidents involving aviation. Federal
law mandates that it is the duty of the NTSB "to prescribe
regulations governing the notification and reporting of ac-
cidents involving civil aircraft,"' to "investigate or have in-
vestigated . . . and establish the facts, circumstances, and
cause or probable cause of an aircraft accident,""' and to
make its reports public in such fashion as it may deem to be
in the public interest.1 2 In carrying out this duty, the
NTSB is specifically authorized to "inspect and test, to the
extent necessary, any civil aircraft, aircraft engine, propel-
ler, appliance, or property on an aircraft involved in an ac-
cident in air commerce."' 13
The regulations promulgated for the NTSB further ex-
plain the manner in which investigative activities are con-
ducted. After an accident occurs, the designated NTSB
investigator-in-charge organizes and controls the field
phase of the investigation and assumes the responsibility of
supervising and coordinating the resources and activities of
all personnel involved in the investigation. 1 4 As a part of
this responsibility, the investigator-in-charge may designate
the parties to the field investigation."' Only persons desig-
nated by the investigator-in-charge are permitted access to
the wreckage. 16 Such persons are limited, moreover, to
"persons, government agencies, companies, and associa-
tions whose employees, functions, activities, or products
were involved in the accident or incident and who can pro-
vide suitable qualified technical personnel to actively assist
in the field investigation."" 7 In addition, no party to the
110 Act ofJuly 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 1 (d), 108 Stat. 753 (to be codified at
49 U.S.C. § 1132(b)).
11 Act of Oct. 25, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-411, § 3(a), 108 Stat. 4237 (to be codified
at 49 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1) (A)).
112 Id. (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1131(d)).
-, Act ofJuly 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 1 (d), 108 Stat. 754 (to be codified at
49 U.S.C. § 1134(b)(1)).
114 49 C.F.R. § 831.8 (1993).
15 Id. § 831.9(2).
11 Id. § 831.10(a).
17 Id. § 831.11(a).
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'field investigation may be represented by any person who
also represents claimants or insurers. 1 8
The participants in an accident investigation are required
to be "responsive to the direction" of the NTSB investigator-
in-charge." 9 The participants are legally and technically
acting under the authority and supervision of the investiga-
tor-in-charge during the field investigation. Consequently,
some practitioners have suggested that the participants of
an NTSB accident investigation should be shielded from
civil spoliation claims arising from actions taken in further-
ance of that investigation.
As a practical matter, however, the NTSB investigator
may lack significant technical expertise in the areas of sci-
ence, engineering, mechanics, powerplants, avionics, and
the like. Indeed, it is this very lack of comprehensive exper-
tise that is anticipated in authorizing the investigator to ap-
point representatives from manufacturers and operators to
serve on the investigative team. The NTSB investigator nec-
essarily relies heavily on the recommendations, judgments,
and methodologies offered by the manufacturer's
representative.
Thus, it is to be expected that while the NTSB investiga-
tor remains technically in charge of all aspects of the field
investigation, there are times (for example, during an en-
gine teardown) when the investigator in fact defers to and
expects leadership from the manufacturer's representative.
If an allegation is made that the manufacturer's representa-
tive recommended or performed a procedure that resulted
in the destruction of evidence, a spoliation claim might be
pursued against the manufacturer in a subsequent products
liability litigation. This is particularly likely where it is al-
leged that an alternative, non-destructive procedure was
available but was not utilized. There is at least limited au-
thority that indicates such a claim is possible.
ns Id. § 831.11(c).
119 Id. § 831.11(b).
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In Graham v. Teledyne-Continental Motors120 the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals considered an appeal from a Califor-
nia federal district court's refusal to enjoin the NTSB from
going forward with an accident investigation. Graham, the
executrix of the estate of the pilot of the accident aircraft,
sought to prevent the NTSB from conducting an engine
teardown at Teledyne's facilities without the participation
of her expert. Graham requested that her expert be given
permission to participate in, or at least observe, the tear-
down inspection. When her request was denied by the
NTSB and Teledyne, Graham filed suit seeking injunctive
relief, alleging that the teardown would destroy evidence
and would deprive her of due process by impairing her
legal rights. 121
The Ninth Circuit noted that it is common practice for
the NTSB to disassemble aircraft engines on the premises
of the manufacturer with the participation of the manufac-
turer's personnel. This practice "grows out of the NTSB's
belief that the manufacturer and its staff are best equipped
to perform such functions."1 22 The court also recognized
that this is a cost-saving practice for the NTSB, because it
saves the NTSB from maintaining staff and facilities of its
own capable of performing this aspect of the investiga-
tion.123 Thus, the court clearly recognized that the NTSB,
in some respects, relies on the facilities and the expertise of
the manufacturer.
The Ninth Circuit considered and rejected each of Gra-
ham's suggested grounds for enjoining the engine tear-
down. It held that under the NTSB's regulations, she had
no right to participate through her expert unless author-
ized by the investigator-in-charge. 24 Further, the court
held that the investigator-in-charge did not act improperly
by designating Teledyne as a participant and not the plain-
-o 805 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 815 (1987).
12 Id. at 1387-88.
12 Id. at 1387.
12- Id. at 1387 n.1.
124 Id. at 1389.
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tiff's expert, because "use of Teledyne's facilities and exper-
tise... could be indispensable [sic] in enabling the NTSB
to carry out its mission," whereas the plaintiff's expert had
nothing unique to add to the investigation. 2 5 Additionally,
the court held that the plaintiff's situation did not impli-
cate her constitutional rights to due process because the
mere deprivation of evidence does not result in a due pro-
cess violation. 126
Finally, the court addressed Graham's claim that she
feared Teledyne might alter or destroy evidence during the
course of the inspection. The court stated:
Appellant has expressed concern that Teledyne may alter or
destroy vital evidence. This case, however, is not much dif-
ferent from those where an adverse party retains possession
of key elements of proof, e.g., purloined trade secrets, docu-
ments proving fraud, or machinery involved in personal in-
jury accidents. The presumptions and sanctions available to
punish those who alter or destroy evidence must be consid-
ered sufficient to deter any misconduct and Teledyne is no
doubt aware that its handling of the materials may come
under intense scrutiny. In any case, as we understand the
NTSB's procedures, the engines will be handled by
Teledyne employees only under the supervision of NTSB
investigators. 12 7
This language in the Ninth Circuit's opinion suggests
that the spoliation remedies available in an ordinary case
are also available against a manufacturer in the context of
an NTSB investigation. It should be remembered that the
Graham case arose in California, which has recognized tort
actions for spoliation. Therefore, the "presumptions and
sanctions" to which the Ninth Circuit referred may include
all four of the previously discussed spoliation remedies.
The court's final sentence in the quoted language indi-
cates an assumption that spoliation may be less likely to oc-
cur in the NTSB investigation context, because the NTSB
12 Id.
12 Id. at 1390.
127 Id. at 1390 n.9 (citations omitted).
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investigator is ostensibly obligated to be present at all times
during the teardown inspection. Such an assumption may
be correct regarding instances of intentional, overt spolia-
tion. That is, an employee of a manufacturer is less likely to
intentionally destroy or discard a component of the engine
when an NTSB investigator is standing next to him or her.
As we have seen above, however, the trend in spoliation law
is to impose sanctions for careless acts and omissions lead-
ing to the alteration or destruction of evidence. This type
of spoliation is not automatically less likely to occur merely
because the teardown is being supervised.
For example, if one assumes that the NTSB investigator
on the scene lacks significant expertise regarding mechani-
cal and engineering problems, he or she is reliant on the
"indispensable expertise and facilities" of the manufacturer.
Therefore, although the investigator is supervising the tear-
down, his or her supervision is less meaningful because he
or she may be unable to identify errors in procedures em-
ployed or suggested by the manufacturer's representative.
The investigator may also be unaware of available alterna-
tives that would preserve more evidence. The investigator
is, in addition, more likely to accept without challenge the
recommendations and conclusions of the manufacturer's
personnel.
If during such an investigation a sealed part is disassem-
bled without its condition first being tested or documented
through available non-invasive procedures (for example, x-
ray photography), and the condition of that part at the time
of the accident becomes a significant issue in a subsequent
products liability case, might the manufacturer be charged
with spoliation? Manufacturer's personnel present at the
investigation likely knew that the non-invasive procedures
were available. These personnel were probably also the
most likely to fully appreciate the possible significance of
the part's condition to the operation of the aircraft. Under
these conditions, failure to make the necessary tests, or to
suggest that they be made, might be deemed by a court to
be sanctionable as a careless act of spoliation. Depending
[60
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on the remedy imposed by the court, the result could be
catastrophic to the manufacturer's ability to defend against
the claimant's charges of defectiveness.
The authors suggest that participants of an NTSB investi-
gation should not allow the technically subordinate status
in the investigation or the presence of the investigator-in-
charge to lull them into complacency regarding the respon-
sibility for the conduct of that investigation. Care should be
taken to ensure that the representatives in the field under-
stand that their employer may be later called into account
for the actions taken by the investigative team, particularly
actions involving the employer's own product or within the
representative's area of expertise.
Additional and alternative procedures that are available
should be suggested and explained to the investigator-in-
charge, and his or her approval of the selected procedure
should be obtained. The representatives should document
this approval in their notes of the investigation. If a deci-
sion is made to undertake a test procedure with which the
representative disagrees, his or her reasons for disagree-
ment should be stated to the investigator-in-charge prior to
performance of the test. Any such conversations and objec-
tions should also be recorded in the representative's investi-
gation notes. Even if all reasonable precautions are taken,
spoliation claims cannot be rendered entirely impossible.
However, the likelihood that such a claim may successfully
be made can, at the very least, be reduced.
VIII. SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
One only need observe the number of cases on this sub-
ject reported in the past ten years or the number and fre-
quency of articles written in the past five years to be
convinced that we are in the midst of a dynamic, develop-
ing and perhaps expanding area of law regarding spoliation
of evidence. Concerns with the degree of culpability, ap-
propriateness and degree of sanctions, origins of the duty
owed, and presumptions about damages arising comprise
the active dialogue of the cases. The courts seem intent on
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protecting parties from unjust results that could arise from
haphazard or intentional mishandling of evidence. The ex-
tent to which courts will go in the future is not entirely
clear, and how a party to an aircraft accident investigation is
dealt with for being a participant to a spoliated piece of
evidence is uncertain and likely dependent upon where the
case is pending, or in the case of the independent tort,
where the spoliation occurred.
It seems doubtful that this area of law will be extended to
the on-site field investigations as a matter of practicality.
Can the entire site be maintained in an undisturbed state
until all parties have viewed the location and condition of
the wreckage and its parts? Would the time required to ac-
complish that not invite spoliation by the elements? Noth-
ing in the published cases indicates that proper
documentation and photography of the site and wreckage
would not constitute adequate preservation of evidence.
The off-site inspection and testing would seem to be a
different matter, however. After the wreckage and compo-
nents are removed to a salvage yard, teardown facility, fixed
base operations facility, or an airframe or component man-
ufacturer's facility, the impracticality of preserving evidence
dissipates. If a crucial bit of evidence is irreparably changed
in a manner that could affect the outcome of a subsequent
trial, it appears that the courts in several jurisdictions will
find a means to correct the wrong. It appears unlikely that
fault will be placed upon the governmental agency charged
with overall responsibility for the inspection and testing,
unless that agency has sufficient knowledge concerning the
effect that the questioned procedure would have on the
item as a piece of evidence. It is more likely that the manu-
facturer with superior knowledge of the effect that such
testing will have upon the permanent alteration of the evi-
dence might be found responsible for the spoliation.
What action should interested parties take who are not
included? This group could consist of passengers, pilots,
owners of the aircraft, rebuild facilities, and maintenance
facilities. Obviously, some of these persons or entities will
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not suspect that they will become parties until long after the
incident. The following suggestions, then, should be fol-
lowed as soon as notice is received that the non-participants
may be the subject of a claim or possess a claim. When they
receive such notice, they should consider taking the follow-
ing actions either directly or through their authorized
representative:
(1) Contact the facility maintaining the wreckage, the
NTSB, and the owner of the wreckage if known, and copy
all known parties that participated in the investigation and
request the following:
(a) preservation of wreckage in its current state;
(b) notification of all planned testing, teardowns, re-
moval of components, and request to participate or ob-
serve; and
(c) identification of any and all components or parts that
are being kept at a different facility or facilities.
(2) State with as much specificity as possible in your notice
letter:
(a) that you anticipate the filing of a legal action for or
against you;
(b) the importance of certain components and the con-
dition to the pursuit or defense of a potential claim; and
(c) that alteration, loss or destruction of identified com-
ponents or the parts of the wreckage could substantially
affect your ability to prosecute or defend a legal action
arising from the accident.
The notice under current policies will likely have little
impact upon what you actually receive in response and will
typically not result in an invitation to participate. It will,
however, provide a basis for asserting a position that the
participants may have been substantially prejudiced by any
spoliation that might subsequently occur. This will meet
the criteria of most courts for seeking either sanctions or
other available remedies.
What actions should participants take to protect them-
selves and their employers from liability? For that matter,
how should the participant in an NTSB investigation re-
spond to a notice such as that suggested above? Unless you
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are the NTSB, you should consider the following in any re-
sponse to a non-participant's request:
(1) acknowledge the request, and advise that decisions on
matters addressed in the request are within the authority of
the NTSB investigator-in-charge (you might even enclose a
copy of the pertinent regulation);
(2) avoid any statements that could be construed as an
"agreement" to maintain evidence unless you have control
over that component and decisions affecting its handling;
and
(3) copy the NTSB office with which you are working on
the response and enclose a copy of the nonparticipant
request.
In general, regarding any aircraft accident, organizations
that regularly participate in NTSB investigations should dis-
cuss the subject of potential spoliation of evidence with per-
sonnel involved on-site and at teardown or testing facilities.
Be certain that those persons clearly understand their func-
tion relative to the NTSB investigator, and inform them
that their duty in assisting and supporting the investigation
may include advising the investigator of the possible effect
of certain procedures on the condition of the component
or part. They should also suggest the least invasive proce-
dures that will accomplish the intended purpose of the in-
vestigation. Documentation by means of photographs,
videotapes, and/or x-rays should be suggested whenever
more invasive procedures are required. Finally, make notes
or use a checklist to record everything that is done with the
wreckage during the investigation. This list should include
recommendations and suggestions made that are intended
to preserve parts and components.
The suggested procedures are minimal and should in no
way interfere with the mandate of the NTSB in conducting
its investigation. Each participant will likely not be involved
with every piece and component of the wreckage. For that
reason, the participant's notes should clearly reflect those
duties assigned by the NTSB investigator-in-charge and the
parts or components with which the participant had first-
hand contact during the investigation.
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Given the number of reported cases in 1993 and 1994, it
appears that the courts will continue to expand and define
the law regarding spoliation of evidence. The jurisdictions
that are granting judges broad discretion in fashioning ap-
propriate sanctions from adverse presumption to summary
disposition and costs seem to avoid the problems with
equality in application of tort remedies between plaintiffs
and defendants. As those jurisdictions define the parame-
ters of conduct and their corresponding sanctions with
more clarity, perhaps the deterrent effect for such behavior
that the courts have tried to remedy will occur as a by-
product.
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